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Introduction  
 
The adversarial court system of England and Wales gradually came into being in the 
eighteenth century; pivotal to its development was the Treasons Trial Act of 1696 
which for the first time afforded defendants the right to counsel. During this period, 
the adversarial system emerged based upon three main features: a neutral and 
passive decision-maker; the production of persuasive evidence on behalf of the 
prosecution and “an elaborate set of rules” to regulate the trial and the conduct of 
advocates.2 Over time advocates “took increasing command of the conduct of the 
trial” and thus the previously more dominant role of defendants (and also the judge) 
diminished; whilst the advent of a system of public prosecutions was crucial in 
reducing the role of the private victim.3 
 
There is, however, a “natural tension” between the adversarial nature of the system 
and ensuring that witnesses and defendants receive “appropriate treatment”.4 Recent 
years have seen an increased focus on the need for complainants, other lay 
witnesses and defendants (hereafter ‘court users’) to be able to effectively participate 
and engage within this adversarial system – for example, through being able to 
understand proceedings and express themselves adequately. The Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act (YJCEA) 1999 introduced the first major legislative support for 
victims and witnesses at court. Provisions set out in the Act enable vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses to give their best evidence by using a variety of “special 
measures” such as pre-recorded evidence-in-chief; giving evidence via live link 
outside the courtroom; giving evidence from behind a screen; the removal of wigs 
and gowns in the courtroom and the granting of registered intermediaries to assist 
those with speech, language and communication difficulties. Other significant 
developments include the launch of the Witness Service in 1994; the introduction of 
Victim Personal Statements in 2001, which allow victims to describe how a crime has 
affected them; the publication of the (revised) Code of Practice for Victims of Crime 
(Victims’ Code) in 2015 which sets out victims’ entitlements within the criminal justice 
process and the piloting of pre-recorded cross-examination (Section 28 of the 
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YJCEA) in four areas of England and Wales in serious cases involving vulnerable 
witnesses, which is scheduled to be rolled out to all Crown Courts by the end of 
2017.5 The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has also recently issued guidance for 
prosecutors with regard to their role in ensuring that witnesses are able to give their 
best evidence.6 
 
A defendant’s need to be able to effectively participate in criminal proceedings is 
reflected in Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, the right to a fair 
trial, and the supporting case law.7 The importance of defendants being able to 
engage in a meaningful way in proceedings appears to have received less attention 
in comparison to that of victims and witnesses and, as with victims and witnesses, 
much of the focus that has been afforded to defendants has been directed towards 
those who are deemed to be vulnerable.8 In addition to the adjustments it affords to 
victims and witnesses, the YJCEA also includes provision for vulnerable defendants 
to give evidence via live link; and a yet to be enacted measure to afford defendants 
with speech, language and communication difficulties with access to a registered 
intermediary. On “rare” occasions the court can exercise its common law powers to 
grant access to an intermediary for vulnerable defendants with communication 
difficulties.9 The 2015 Criminal Practice Direction sets out several court adaptations 
to assist vulnerable defendants including the removal of wigs and gowns; allowing 
defendants be seated with a family member or supporter in a position that facilitates 
communication with their legal representative; the use of clear and understandable 
language; allowing for regular breaks in proceedings and, in cases where a 
defendant with communication needs is to give evidence, a discussion of the ground 
rules.10 In addition to this, The Advocate’s Gateway (hosted by the Inns of Court 
College of Advocacy) provides various online toolkits aimed at assisting legal 
professionals in cases involving vulnerable court users.11  
 
This focus on the ways in which levels of engagement among court users can be 
enhanced comes at a time of increased pressure and strain within the court system.12 
The climate of national austerity has brought to bear a number of reforms in recent 
years which may impede efforts to ensure that court users are able to meaningfully 
participate in criminal proceedings. These include, but are not limited to, legal aid 
reforms implemented as a result of provisions set out in the Legal Aid Punishment 
and Sentencing of Offenders Act and the closure of a number of courts as a result of 
falls in the number of cases coming before the courts.13  
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In the context of this juxtaposition between policy developments aimed at supporting 
court users during proceedings and the various economic constraints which may 
inhibit this, this paper examines the ways in which “court culture” can impact upon 
court users’ ability to engage effectively with the court process by drawing on the 
findings of two recent courts-based studies in which the author has been involved.  
 
Methods 
 
The first study upon which this paper draws is a twenty-month ethnographic study of 
the public’s experiences of the Crown Court, funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council.14 The aims of this study (hereafter the Crown Court study) were to 
examine the essential features of the Crown Court process, as experienced by 
victims15, witnesses and defendants; to explore the nature of the interplay between 
the different players in the courtroom; and to examine the extent to which court 
users’ regarded court processes and outcomes as fair and legitimate. The empirical 
research was conducted in 2011 and 2012 at two Crown Courts, selected to be 
contrasting in terms of the areas they served: one was a large court in an urban area 
and the other was a medium-sized court in a provincial city. The empirical research 
primarily involved i) in-depth interviews with court users and professionals and ii) 
observations of court proceedings.  
 
A total of 90 adult court users were interviewed; this included 45 from the prosecution 
side (including 14 victims, 30 other prosecution witnesses and one mother of a victim 
who observed proceedings from the public gallery) and 45 from the defence side 
(including 37 defendants who were convicted of at least one charge; 4 defendants 
who were acquitted on all charges and 4 family members of defendants). Victims, 
other prosecution witnesses and their family members were recruited via the Witness 
Service; convicted defendants were recruited via probation and acquitted defendants 
via defence lawyers. In interview, participants were asked about the offence, or 
alleged offence, in relation to which they were appearing at court; their experiences 
and feelings before, during and after their court appearance; their perceptions of their 
treatment by criminal justice professionals and practitioners; and their views about 
the fairness, or otherwise, of the court process and outcome.  
 
Interviews were also carried out with 57 professionals and practitioners who worked 
in or around the two Crown Courts, including judges, advocates, court staff, Witness 
Service staff and volunteers and registered intermediaries. Professionals and 
 4 
 
practitioners were asked about their perceptions of which aspects of the court 
process pose the greatest difficulties to court users; the availability and effectiveness 
of measures to support court users’ engagement in proceedings and the factors that 
shape court users’ perceptions of fairness, or otherwise, of court processes and 
outcomes. In addition to this 200 hours of observation of a variety of hearings, 
including seven full trials (for cases such as assault, robbery, sexual assault, 
perverting the course of justice and dangerous driving) and a number of other 
hearings such as sentencing and pre-trial hearings. 
 
The second study upon which this paper will draw is a review of advocacy in youth 
proceedings, commissioned by the Bar Standards Board and CILEx Regulation and 
conducted in 2014 and 2015.16 The aim of this study (hereafter the Youth 
Proceedings study) was to assess the effectiveness of advocacy in proceedings 
involving young people in both the youth court and the Crown Court. It was a mixed-
method study which began with a survey of advocates (barristers and chartered legal 
executive advocates) which explored respondents’ levels of experience, training and 
knowledge in relation to youth proceedings. The survey, which was available in both 
online and paper-based formats and was widely publicised, was completed by 215 
respondents. Further to this 34 follow-up telephone interviews were conducted with 
advocates who had participated in the survey. These interviews explored advocates’ 
experiences of youth proceedings and their views of the factors that could support or 
inhibit effective advocacy.  
 
Interviews were also carried out with 25 young defendants who were recruited 
through youth offending teams and secure establishments; 3 young witnesses, who 
were recruited via the Witness Service at two Crown Courts; and 30 other 
practitioners such as magistrates, district judges, legal advisers, specialist 
prosecutors, intermediaries and youth offending team officers across 18 contrasting 
youth courts. In interview young court users were asked about their experiences of 
attending court and about the quality of the advocates in court; practitioners were 
asked about their perceptions of the quality of advocacy in cases involving young 
court users and about the factors which contributed to good and poor advocacy.  
Finally observations of court proceedings, including trials, sentencing hearings and 
breach hearings, were carried out at four youth courts and five Crown Courts across 
the country. 
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Broadly speaking, both pieces of research were small-scale studies which sought to 
generate an in-depth understanding of the experiences of court users; this means, 
however, that there are limits to the extent to which the findings are representative of 
court users across England and Wales. Moreover, neither study included a focus 
upon court users who appear in the adult magistrates’ courts. 
 
What is court culture? 
 
Organisational culture has been the subject of debate, theorisation and research in a 
number of criminal justice settings including policing, prisons and probation.17 With 
respect to the criminal courts, Church expressed criticism of the “inherent 
vagueness” and “lack of definitional clarity” in discussions of the concept of culture in 
the court setting.18 However, drawing on the work of Church, “court culture” has since 
been defined by Hucklesby as: 
 
“A set of informal norms which are mediated through the working 
relationships of the various participants”.19  
 
Existing empirical examinations of the concept have centred on local court cultures 
which emerge in relation to specific aspects of decision-making within a small 
number of courts,20 or have focused upon a single actor within the court, usually 
members of the judiciary.21 From a policy perspective, the potential impact of “court 
culture” on vulnerable court users has been identified on a number of occasions in 
recent years. For example, in relation to the treatment of complainants in trials 
involving sexual violence, the Ministry of Justice stressed the need for “cultural 
change in the courtroom”; the Carlile Inquiry cited “Crown Court culture” as a barrier 
to the implementation of adaptations set out in the 2013 CPD for child defendants; 
and Lord Rook pointed to the presence of a “culture of resistance” among advocates 
with regard to accommodating special adjustments for vulnerable court users.22 
However, such discussions have been of a general nature and have failed to define 
or fully examine the concept. The work of Emily Henderson offers the most 
significant contemporary contribution to this discussion. Her work examines the 
concept of culture specifically in relation to cross-examination, within which she 
argues that cultural change is required in order to ensure that recent legislative and 
policy reforms become a reality.23  
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This article seeks to explore “court culture” at a broader level than the existing 
empirical studies which have been of a local nature, while seeking to provide a 
detailed examination of what this culture comprises - something which has been 
largely absent from existing policy-oriented discussions. Three features of court 
culture have been identified from the findings of the two studies: the ritualised and 
formal nature of court proceedings; the presence of a “them and us” relationship 
between legal professionals and court users; and the organised yet chaotic nature of 
court proceedings.  
 
i. Ritualised and formal nature of proceedings 
 
The ritualised and formal nature of court proceedings is an intrinsic feature of the 
court setting.24 Key aspects of this include the architecture of the courtroom, namely 
the positioning of members of the judiciary and the magistracy on raised benches 
and the positioning of the defendant in the (often secured glass) dock at the back of 
the courtroom; formal attire which usually includes, in the Crown Court, the wearing 
of wigs and gowns by judges, advocates and court staff; and the use of highly formal, 
technical and often theatrical language. It has been argued that such a ceremonial 
form of interaction, particularly in the Crown Court, creates “an aura of authority and 
a sense of detachment from the mundane world outside”.25 However such features 
have a corresponding impact on court users which may affect their ability to engage 
with the court process.  
 
Findings from both the Crown Court study and the Youth Proceedings study indicate 
that court users frequently find the ritualised and formal nature of proceedings to be 
intimidating, as the following quotations from interviewees illustrate: 
 
“It just seems very scary when you go in because of the way the setup is and 
everything. It has to be that way, I know. But it’s just very frightening, very 
daunting when you walk in and you see all the chairs and the benches and 
everything set out and then you see all these people with their wigs on and 
the gowns.” (Julia, witness – Crown Court study)26 
 
“There were loads of emotions running through my head, and it was all 
enclosed, I was in a glass box with my co-defendant, loads of people are 
watching you from the galleries, you’ve got papers there, press there, loads of 
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people walk in that you don’t know, it’s all mad.” (Jabir, young defendant – 
Youth Proceedings study) 
 
The following advocate, who was interviewed as part of the Youth Proceedings 
study, reflected upon the impact that such formality and ritual of the courtroom 
environment could have upon a young defendant’s ability to engage with 
proceedings: 
 
“I don’t personally – although it still is super common – like the idea of 
appearing in front of young defendants robed up as if I’ve just walked in from 
the 1600s; with a judge that is sitting 20 foot higher than the rest of the court 
and my defendant miles behind me in a dock. … I don’t think it’s the best way 
for [children] to sit through hearings which might have a very serious impact 
on their future life.”  
 
Provisions are set out in the YJCEA 1999 and the 2015 CPD for the removal of wigs 
and gowns by legal professionals in cases involving vulnerable court users (within 
which children are automatically included) and for vulnerable defendants to be 
seated with family members or supporters in close proximity to their advocate (i.e. 
outside of the dock); while the youth court was created with the specific intention of 
removing some of the formality from proceedings. However the Carlile Inquiry found 
that such adaptations are not always adhered to and, as noted above, “Crown Court 
culture”, was cited as a possible reason for this.27 Meanwhile, recent research has 
found that the YJCEA legislation that enables vulnerable defendants to give evidence 
via live link is seldom implemented.28 Findings from our interviews with young 
defendants also suggest that the special adaptations for young defendants are not 
routinely implemented.  For example, in interview, several young defendants referred 
to “capes” being worn by legal professionals during proceedings and others, like 
Jabir as quoted above, spoke of being seated in a secure glass dock.  
 
It has been argued that the positioning of defendants in docks at the back of courts 
inhibits communication between the defendant and their advocate because the 
advocate is positioned with his or her back to the defendant; communication is 
further constrained when the defendant is situated in a secure glass dock.29 Findings 
from both of our studies, in particular the Youth Proceedings study, suggest that such 
positioning can prevent a defendant from being able to adequately express 
themselves. Several defendants spoke of being scared to interrupt proceedings 
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(either to ask for clarity on certain points or to provide further clarity to the matter 
being discussed); while others spoke of feeling “caged in” (Riley) or “isolated” (Habib) 
by the dock. Jackson, described how the formality of the setting made it difficult for 
him to actively participate in proceedings:  
 
“It’s like a big play that we’re not in but you’re watching but it’s about your life. 
… You feel like you can’t even speak to the judge at certain times because 
even like the way you’ve got to address the judge it’s very formal … When 
you’ve got to address the judge [do you say] ‘Your Honour’, I can’t even 
remember, [or] ‘Your Majesty’?”  
 
The elaborate and antiquated language of the courtroom, which is another 
manifestation of the formality and ritual of the courtroom, often impedes court users’ 
understanding of, and thereby their engagement with, the proceedings. Our Crown 
Court observations highlight how legal professionals often adopt ceremonial and 
theatrical styles of communication and make regular use of complex words and 
concepts which court users may find difficult to understand.30 Examples of this 
include: 
 
“Discourtesy to the court by arriving late hardly instils the court with 
confidence about a non-custodial sentence.” (Judge, sentencing hearing) 
 
“May I turn my back, Your Honour? [Consults the police officers behind him], 
I’m sure the endeavours Your Honour has referred to can be put into play 
again.” (Prosecution advocate, trial) 
 
“I would submit that whilst Your Honour must commensurate with Your 
Honour’s public duty impose a custodial sentence, that Your Honour can 
properly suspend that sentence.” (Defence advocate, sentencing hearing) 
 
A significant number of the young defendants interviewed as part of the Youth 
Proceedings study spoke of the difficulties they encountered in following court 
proceedings. This is particularly well demonstrated by the following extract from a 
focus group conducted with young people who had experience of attending court as 
defendants: 
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Jackson: My last case was the most difficult because it was the most 
serious one and basically the prosecution wanted me to get 
imprisonment for public protection and so there was the 
language that they were using and things like that, it was just 
all foreign. It was loads of words like ‘ying’ and ‘yang’. 
 
 Asif:      They said ying yang?  
 
Jackson: That’s the actual words that I heard in the courtroom. I mean I 
don’t know what that means. 
 
Felicity: Probably Latin… 
 
Across both the Crown Court and Youth Proceedings study, there were some 
similarities in how defendants described courtroom language, with repeated 
references to “posh”, “big” or “fancy” words: 
 
“I didn’t really understand what they were saying … they used big words and 
stuff.” (Casper, young defendant) 
 
“Some of the words were too posh, adults might get the words but to 
teenagers like me it was all like long posh words and that.” (Peter, young 
defendant) 
 
“Well, it’s posh innit? The courts are posh. It’s all posh to me, everyone in 
wigs; everyone talks in this funky language.” (Ali, adult defendant) 
 
 
ii. The “them and us” divide 
 
A significant finding of the Crown Court study was that the main divide in the 
courtroom is not between the prosecution and the defence (or between victim and 
defendant), as might be expected, but between lay court users and the professionals 
(judges, advocates and court staff) in court. This divide can be described in terms of 
a “them and us” relationship between courts users, who occupy the position of 
“them”, and professionals, who assume the position of “us” in the courtroom. This 
section argues that though there is a clear need, for both legal and security reasons, 
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to keep a “physical and metaphorical”31 distance between “them” and “us” – or 
“outsiders” and ‘”insiders”32– this divide can also serve to limit the extent to which 
court users are able to effectively engage in court proceedings.  
 
“Them and us”: assembling the cast 
Jacobson and colleagues deployed the oft-used “court as theatre” analogy in 
describing the “them and us” divide.33 In doing so, it was argued that court users, 
rather than assuming main roles within the performance, play minor “walk-on” or 
“extra” parts, in proceedings in which the legal professionals (the judge, and 
principally, the prosecution advocate and defence advocate) take on the starring 
roles. The “walk-on” role of victims and witnesses within the court process is well-
documented34 and the resulting sense of marginalisation is evident at various points 
in proceedings. For example, findings from the Crown Court study show that victims 
and witnesses can feel side-lined by the fact that the prosecution advocate acts on 
behalf of the state and is not their own lawyer. This is something many were unaware 
of prior to their court appearance, as the following quotation from Masood, a victim of 
racially aggravated abuse, highlights: 
 
“When I went in the court, I don’t know who is my solicitor? Who is going to 
defend me? Who is going to look after me? I don’t know anything”  
 
Furthermore, victims and witnesses are often only present in court at the point at 
which they give evidence (unless they decide to observe proceedings from the public 
gallery once their evidence has concluded). This absence from the entirety of 
proceedings means that they tend not to be present at the time at which important 
concepts – such as the burden of proof – are explained to other lay members of the 
courtroom. Having an understanding of the burden of proof can be instrumental in a 
witness’s sense of whether or not they have been believed, as the following 
quotation from a CPS advocate conveys: 
 
“I have a duty when opening a case to mention the burden of proof. So the 
jury hear it, the defendant hears it, but does the victim and witness hear it? 
No … I will definitely before a trial go and speak to [a victim] and say, ‘And I 
want you to understand that just because [the defendant] doesn’t get 
convicted it doesn’t mean that people are saying this didn’t happen.’ And I 
explain to them something about the burden of proof or the standard of proof; 
if you don’t explain that to them they will think the process is unfair.”  
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Defendants, meanwhile, can be said to assume the position of “ever-present extras”. 
Defendants are central yet marginal players in criminal proceedings: they are 
(usually) present throughout, and have the power to entirely change the course of 
proceedings – for example by changing their plea – yet they are rarely the focus of 
the court’s attention and can appear to be incidental to proceedings. This is well-
illustrated by the young defendant, Reuben, who described feeling surprised at being 
spoken to directly during his most recent court appearance: 
 
“I’ve never been spoken to by anyone at the magistrates’ [court] apart from 
the last time I went to court. [Being spoken to] feels good and bad at the 
same [time]; bad because you’re put on the spot, but good because you’re 
[not] … pretending you’re not there, even though they’re talking about your 
future.” 
 
The peripheral role occupied by defendants in court proceedings is something that 
had not gone unnoticed by several of the advocates interviewed. For example, when 
asked to describe how a defendant might find appearing in court, one advocate 
interviewed for the Crown Court study responded: 
 
“As if they have no power in the situation. So everything is sort of going on 
around them. And sometimes there’s something that can be done about it – 
that they can do about it – but quite often there isn’t ... And, you know, it all 
sort of passes them by really, with them occasionally chipping in.”  
The “dummy player”35 status of defendants was also manifest in a passive attitude 
displayed by defendants interviewed for the Crown Court study, demonstrated by 
frequent use of phrases such as wanting to “get it over with” or “forget about it”, in 
response to questions about the court process. 
 
The passivity of defendants and the marginalisation of victims and witnesses mirror 
each other and underpin the divide in the relationship between “us” (the 
professionals) and “them” (the court users). This sense of passivity and 
marginalisation is likely to limit the extent to which court users are able to 
meaningfully partake in court proceedings. The findings of the Crown Court study 
suggest that court users can feel particularly marginalised by their exclusion from the 
relationships between professionals at court – namely, the judge and advocates – 
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who assume central status in the courtroom performance. The “them” status of court 
users was often most strongly felt when they were exposed to the seemingly 
“chummy” relationships between defence and prosecution counsel. This is 
demonstrated in the following quotations from court users interviewed during the 
Crown Court study: 
 
“I just felt like [the defence counsel] didn’t look happy; he looked miserable: a 
face of disbelief at what I’m saying. But it’s funny, because every time we 
were paused for a break that face would just go and he would laugh and talk 
to my barrister as if they were friends.” (Faris, victim) 
 
“[The] prosecutor and your barrister – they’re all friends. When I got the gist of 
that [after overhearing my advocate and the prosecutor discuss being invited 
to the same Christmas lunch] I was very unhappy …How can you be friends 
with the opposition?” (Danny, defendant) 
 
As noted during some of our court observations, displays of “insider” status on the 
part of professionals were also apparent in exchanges of banter between the judge 
and advocates in the courtroom; a camaraderie which was often overlaid by class 
differences between legal professionals and court users. This is underlined by the 
following exchange between a judge and a (pale and, by his own admission, slightly 
overweight) prosecutor: 
 
Judge:   If you play outdoor sports you know when… 
 
Prosecutor:   [Interrupting] Your Honour can tell from my 
svelte physique that I don’t play outdoor sports  
 
Judge:  [Smiling] Yes, and from your sun tan 
 
Further displays of the “them and us” relationships between court users and 
professionals were also evident in the different players’ occupation of space within 
the court building.36 As the previous section highlighted, the physical layout of the 
courtroom and legal attire worn by professionals serves to separate court users from 
legal professionals. In the wider court building and waiting areas, the divide was 
represented by the visible contrast of the purposeful way in which professionals 
(“insiders”) – usually donned in legal regalia – moved through the building with the 
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restless or bored-seeming demeanour of court users’ (“outsiders”) who often sat, 
stood, paced around – or even lay down –  in the waiting areas.  
 
Giving evidence: whose “story” is it? 
In addition to experiencing marginalisation through their exclusion from parts of the 
process, through the physical and aesthetic features of the court environment and in 
displays of camaraderie between advocates, court users also face exclusion from the 
world occupied by courtroom professionals at the point at which they might expect to 
take centre stage; that is when giving evidence in the witness box. In the Crown 
Court study, witnesses were often unable to express themselves fully or in a manner 
of their choosing, in part because of the limits imposed on what they could say by the 
rules of evidence.37 As Ron, a victim of assault, described: 
 
“I was angry that certain things weren’t allowed to be said in the court that I 
did think were relevant to the case … I was told by the judge they weren’t 
relevant. Or they were relevant, he said, but they weren’t allowed to be said. 
Like the witness intimidation [allegation] and all that, I wasn’t allowed to say. 
… And yet the [defence] barrister was able to say things that weren’t relevant 
to the case, like the fact the fellow [who] attacked me, that his wife had died 
six months before that and that he had seven kids.” 
 
Court users’ unfamiliarity, and often unease, with the court environment generally – 
and perhaps with public speaking more broadly – is in direct contrast with the 
familiarity and ease with which trained legal professionals communicate with them in 
the courtroom. As Ron, continued: 
 
“After all you’re just a normal person dealing against very skilled, very 
manipulative barristers. … If you’re not a good public speaker, and you’re 
trying to talk in front of people, it’s all right talking on a one-to-one basis, but 
when you’re up there and you’re nervous, and you’re talking, you need help, 
and if people are going to start cutting angles in it and try to manipulate your 
statement and what you’re saying, you need help don’t you?” 
 
Moreover, court users may find themselves – by virtue of the case in which they are 
involved – discussing highly private and often intimate matters in the public arena of 
the courtroom.38  
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Meanwhile cross-examination, particularly aggressively styles of cross-examination, 
can exacerbate differences in communication styles and abilities between legal 
professionals and court users. Cross-examination has been described as the 
“fundamental feature”39 of the adversarial process and there is no dispute that 
evidence should be subject to rigorous and robust challenge.40 Early forms of cross-
examination in the eighteenth century, have since been variously described as: 
“aggressive”, “sarcastic”, “acerbic”, “rude” and “intimidating”41; many of these terms 
could arguably be used to describe cross-examination in the present day.42 There 
have been various reports in the media in recent years which challenge the 
acceptability of defence advocates being permitted to question complainants about 
their sexual history in cases involving sexual offences, or which question the extent 
to which an advocate who chooses to make personal remarks about the demeanour 
or lifestyle of complainants in such cases is appropriate.43 Likewise the acceptability 
of certain cross-examination techniques has come under increasing scrutiny from 
academics and members of the senior judiciary.44 This coincides with a number of 
Court of Appeal decisions that have challenged certain forms of questioning in cases 
involving vulnerable witnesses.45 
 
Findings from both of our studies point to the occurrence of what could be described 
as aggressive and sarcastic cross-examination, which both strengthens the divide 
between professionals and court users and also lends support to existing research 
findings which suggest that such forms of cross-examination are a product of court 
culture.46 For example, as part of the Youth Proceedings study we partially observed 
a Crown Court rape trial involving two defendants, Kwame (aged 16) and Benjamin 
(aged 18), and a complainant, Isabelle (aged 16), who gave evidence via video-link. 
Isabelle was cross-examined separately by both defence advocates over the course 
of an afternoon. Benjamin’s advocate, in particular, questioned Isabelle acerbically; 
Isabelle was asked to account for the fact that she did not scream when the alleged 
incident occurred in a public place; she was asked about her clothing, in particular 
the type and fit of jeans she was wearing – questions included, “are skinny jeans 
tight?” – and about why she had not told anyone about the alleged incident straight 
away. Isabelle was also asked “tag” questions, such as: “The thing about it, Isabelle, 
is that you weren’t being forced at all, were you?”, and had a number of statements 
put to her, such as: “This is quite an important event, obviously, if what you are 
saying is the truth”. This is despite a plethora of calls for children to be asked 
questions, rather than merely given statements to respond to.47  
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In a similar vein, victims and witnesses who participated in the Crown Court study 
spoke in interview of how they had felt upon being cross-examined, and were 
evidently affected by not only the questions that they were asked, but by the manner 
in which they were spoken to.  Several witnesses made reference to what might be 
described as belittling and theatrical gestures used by advocates while they were 
being cross-examined. For example: 
 
“I noticed that every time [the defence advocate] asked me a question he’d 
have the stance of putting his elbow on the table and look at the time – I felt it 
was as if to mock me; I didn’t like him doing that. He definitely kept the face of 
disbelief throughout the whole thing in my opinion.” (Faris, victim) 
 
“I [knew the defence advocate had] to cross-examine me but he was a bit 
smarmy like making faces and stuff. He didn’t really need to do that. Like 
obviously he’s defending [his client] but you don’t need to pull faces when you 
ask me questions.” (Freya, victim)48  
 
However, it would appear that cross-examination styles, particularly as far as 
vulnerable witnesses are concerned, may be in a state of transition. Henderson’s 
interviews with advocates, judges and intermediaries suggest that there have been 
“marked improvements” in cross-examination practice in a relatively short period of 
time; in particular, advocates and judges were increasingly likely to oppose the use 
of “highly coercive question types”, including tagged questions and closed 
questions.49 Likewise, several intermediaries in Plotnikoff and Woolfson’s research 
also noted a keenness among advocates to alter their approach to cross-
examination.50 Nevertheless, questions remain as to whether and how change to 
cross-examination practices should be achieved. A recent study of cross-
examination techniques in rape cases in Australia and New Zealand found that the 
strategies and tactics deployed by advocates at the turn of the twenty-first century 
remained similar to those used in the 1950s.51 Others have pointed to the mismatch 
between the perceptions of policy-makers, researchers and lay audiences and those 
of the legal profession with regard to cross-examination. Henderson, for example, 
pointed to a “discrepancy between the lawyers’ and the researchers’ and witnesses’ 
definitions of harsh and humiliating treatment”52 – and the findings from both the 
Crown Court and Youth Proceedings studies support this. 
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“Doing their job”? 
The awareness that the legal professionals in court were “doing their job”, in contrast 
to the lay status of victims, witnesses and defendants, was regularly expressed by 
court users in both studies. In fact, the phrase “doing their job” (or variants thereof) 
was the most frequently used phrase by court users in the Crown Court study and 
was also used with striking frequency by young defendants in the Youth Proceedings 
study. Examples include: 
 
“There was two [defence advocates] firing stuff at me … and I was just getting 
so confused … they were saying stuff to me as though I was lying. I know it's 
their job but I was just getting so frustrated … I ran out of the courtroom.” 
(Samantha, witness – Crown Court study) 
 
“[The prosecutor] done his job well, so fair play to him.” (Zadie, young 
defendant – Youth Proceedings study) 
 
“[The prosecutor is] doing their job because they're … defending the victim 
[but] they make you feel small and make you feel like everyone in the room 
hates you … I suppose they're just doing their job, but they do make you feel 
uncomfortable.” (Dexter, young defendant – Youth Proceedings study) 
 
As several of the above quotations illustrate, court users often used this phrase to 
justify – or explain – any negative treatment that they felt they had received from 
professionals – for example, while being cross-examined; this negative treatment, it 
was suggested, was simply a reflection of the advocates’ professional duty to pursue 
certain outcomes. The use of this phrase by court users highlights the contrast 
between the personal and the professional in the “them and us” divide: advocates 
are in court to “do a job”, whereas court users’ (particularly victims’ and defendants’) 
presence in court is often the result of a highly significant and even potentially life-
changing event in their lives. Nevertheless the use of this phrase, particularly among 
some of the defendant respondents in the Crown Court study, points to the absence 
of active engagement within the court process, which is instead underpinned by a 
“passive acceptance” of the courts as “a world in themselves, on which outsiders 
have little impact”.53 For example, Sam, an adult defendant with numerous previous 
convictions, described the prosecutor in his most recent trial as: 
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“[A] pretty stereotypical, TV drama, sort of prosecutor. Say something, and 
then not let you get the answer to it sort of thing. But he did his job well and 
got a conviction.” 
 
Overall, it would seem that the nature of the “them and us” relationship between 
professionals and court users can inhibit the extent to which court users are able to 
meaningfully participate in court proceedings. The studies’ findings suggest that this 
divide is not solely borne out of structural factors, such as the design of the court 
building, or the need to protect the legal integrity of proceedings; it is part and parcel 
of the culture of the court, manifest in the tone, manner and style adopted by legal 
professionals.  
 
iii. The organised yet chaotic nature of proceedings: structured mayhem 
 
The final defining feature of court culture evident from the Crown Court and the 
Youth Proceedings studies is the organised yet chaotic manner in which cases 
progress through the court. Jacobson and colleagues used the term “structured 
mayhem” to convey the idea that, while chaos and confusion can arise at each stage 
of proceedings, a sense of structure prevails which allows cases to progress in a 
logical manner to an eventual conclusion. This “structured mayhem” can be evident 
throughout the court process. Perhaps the most common theme for victims, 
witnesses and defendants alike, is that court proceedings involve considerable 
amounts of waiting, delay and interruption.54  
 
The period between a defendant being charged and the case appearing before the 
court for a trial or sentencing hearing can involve lengthy periods of waiting, which 
witnesses often found difficult to balance with their other commitments. Ernie, an 
elderly victim of assault described what, in his view, was a lack of consideration on 
behalf of the court, as to the impact that waiting to give evidence had on him: “I’m 
sure that more thought could have been given to how it was impact[ing] on my work 
and life and the way I was trying to conduct things”. Likewise, defendants often 
described feeling frustrated about the length of time that it took for their cases to be 
dealt with and, ultimately, for their fate to be decided upon:  
 
“[My case was] adjourned six times in six months, once the sentence was 
passed there was a lot of relief because it was over and done with.  I knew 
what I was facing and how long I’d have to stay in prison; the worst side of it 
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is the length of time and the amount of adjournments that could go on.”   
(Alistair, adult defendant who entered a guilty plea at the first opportunity) 
 
“I honestly think there should be a time limit on certain things instead of it 
taking nearly three years to get to a second trial.” (Andy, acquitted adult 
defendant) 
 
Even once cases get to court and the trial begins, court users often endure a further 
period of waiting due to the “start-stop” nature of proceedings.55 We observed, and 
were informed of during interviews with court users, a number of reasons for the 
“start-stop” nature of proceedings. Key players (such as witnesses, defendants, 
jurors and advocates) were often absent or late arriving for hearings; short breaks in 
testimony could be required so that legal arguments could take place; and practical 
or technical hitches frequently arose (for example, paperwork could be missing or 
there could be problems with technical apparatus), resulting in breaks in proceedings 
while these issues were resolved. The length of time witnesses in the Crown Court 
study were required to wait at court to give evidence ranged from minutes to several 
days. In interview, victims and witnesses often spoke of how this waiting and 
uncertainty added to their feelings of trepidation about their court appearance:  
 
“We went up to the [Witness Service waiting] room … and you’re just a bag of 
nerves because you’re just sat there waiting. You don’t know what’s going on 
in court: you know it’s started but you don’t know what’s happening.” 
(Natasha, victim) 
 
“[Waiting to give evidence was] horrible … I think when it is something to do 
with people that you love and that you are close to, you want to know what is 
going on at all times – [it was] a bit nail-biting.” (Michelle, witness) 
In the Youth Proceedings study, young defendants described waiting periods at court 
as “long”, “ridiculous” and “not good”. Our observations, particularly those which took 
place in the Crown Court, highlighted a number of examples of young defendants 
having to wait either for a number of short intermittent periods throughout the day or 
for long periods of unbroken time. One young defendant waited at court for several 
hours in order for his case to be heard and was visibly restless in the waiting area. 
By way of response to this, the young defendant’s mother – who had accompanied 
him to court – suggested that he run up and down the stairs of the court building in 
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order to “let off some steam”; “this is a Crown Court not a play pit”, was his reply. As 
the above examples demonstrate, the varying degrees of restlessness, uncertainty 
and nervousness that waiting periods can inspire may have a corresponding impact 
on the ability of court users to engage with, or participate in, proceedings once they 
do get underway. 
 
The length of time which it takes for cases to progress through the system has not 
gone unchallenged by the government and recent years have seen marked efforts to 
ensure that cases are dealt with as “swiftly” and “efficiently” as possible; this includes 
promoting a “no adjournment culture”, making “better use of technological and other 
advances” – such as virtual hearings – and the use of early guilty plea schemes.56 
Such endeavours should be considered in the context of funding cuts and constraints 
which are having ripple effects across the criminal justice system – for example, as 
legal aid reforms and court closures are implemented. Despite these efforts, findings 
from the Youth Proceedings study suggest that, in some circumstances, a focus on 
“speedy justice” can undermine court user engagement, as the following quotations 
illustrate: 
 
“In practical terms, courts don’t want special [adjustments] for defendants to 
be in place because they just slow things down, they cost money and it takes 
time to put them in place … The whole system, these days, is not geared up, 
necessarily, for justice, fairness and taking time to get reports and check that 
people are participating in trials and cases effectively.” (Advocate) 
 
“What you find in the youth court, if you’re not careful is that you get sausage-
factory justice, where they don’t permit any sort of delay…. There is an 
increasing awareness that delay is a bad thing in the justice system but it 
needs to be applied with a balanced hand.” (Advocate) 
 
Commentators have raised concerns about recent policies designed to promote 
efficiency within the justice system. Ward argued that measures aimed at promoting 
efficiency may “undermine” procedural due process57; while others have cautioned 
that programmes aimed at increasing efficiency also come at a cost.58  Similarly, 
proposals designed to “encourage” early guilty pleas have attracted concern among 
some legal academics.59 
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Overall, it would seem that there is a balance to be struck between promoting a 
culture that focuses on efficiency during times of austerity – and comes with the 
associated laudable intention of seeking to meet the needs of court users by 
reducing unnecessary delay – and at the same time, one which ensures that 
sufficient attention is paid to other fundamental aspects of the court process. This 
includes ensuring that measures aimed at promoting effective participation are 
implemented adequately and making sure that due process remains 
uncompromised.  
 
 
Conclusion: promoting a culture of engagement 
 
This paper has identified and examined three features of “court culture”, namely: the 
ritualised and formal nature of court proceedings; the “them and us” relationship that 
exists between court users and legal professionals; and the organised yet chaotic 
nature of criminal proceedings. Together, it is argued, these features can undermine 
recent legislative and policy reforms aimed at promoting meaningful participation in 
proceedings. Henderson has specifically argued that legislative and policy reform 
alone are unlikely to achieve longstanding change in practice, asserting that: “the 
single most important factor in achieving any sort of change in trial practice is not 
legislation or governmental policy declarations but the attitude of the judiciary and the 
legal profession”.60 The most promising way of enhancing effective engagement 
among court users is, therefore, to “work from within the culture”61 in order that the 
changes sought by policy and legislative developments can properly take root.  
 
Procedural justice theory offers a way of thinking about the extent to which small but 
significant shifts in attitude by the legal profession can foster meaningful engagement 
among court users within the confines of the adversarial system. Proponents of the 
theory emphasise the role that fair and respectful treatment (alongside fair decision-
making) can play in boosting the perceived legitimacy of justice systems and 
consequent cooperation with authorities.62 Four principles of procedural justice have 
been identified in relation to the court setting. These are: 
 
i. “Voice”: court users should have an opportunity to “tell their side of the story”; 
ii. “Neutrality”: decisions should be made by neutral decision-makers who follow 
established rules;  
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iii. “Respect”: court users should be treated with respect by all those involved in 
the court process;  
iv. “Trust”: court users should feel as though they are treated in a sincere and 
considerate manner and as though they are listened to and treated without 
prejudice.63  
Discussion of what this might entail in practical terms for those professionals who 
occupy the “starring roles” in court proceedings is growing within the research 
literature. With regard to the role of the judiciary, it has been argued that “judgecraft” 
requires:  
 
“An ability to communicate decisions in a way that both those affected by the 
decision and those simply interested in it perceive as reflecting serious and 
deep consideration. That is, the judge needs to be able to convey a sense of 
caring and concern.”64  
 
The role of the prosecutor, Cheng argues, should focus upon bringing about a “just” 
decision rather than simply on “winning” the case; therefore a main part of the 
prosecutor’s role should be to “treat everyone, including defendants and opposing 
witnesses, with courtesy and respect and … ensure that everyone has the 
opportunity to meaningfully tell their side of the story”.65 Recent research has found 
that perceptions of legitimacy in the justice system are enhanced when defendants 
feel as though they have been treated in a procedurally just way by their advocate.66 
 
The findings of the two studies at the crux of this paper lend support to the tenets put 
forward by procedural justice scholars because, though they indicate that court users 
do tend to place a high degree of importance on outcomes (such as the verdict or 
sentence severity), the treatment received at the hands of legal professionals was 
also very important to them. This was indicated in comments made by a number of 
interviewees during discussions about advocates. Interestingly, in line with the 
preceding discussion, this was again often framed in terms of what it meant for legal 
professionals to “do their job”: 
  
“The [prosecutor’s] job is to make you out to be bad … but I would tell them to 
remember that [the defendant is] still a person” (Austin, young defendant) 
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“Obviously the [defence advocate is] there to do a job and I fully understand 
that … they do whatever they can to get the right decision for [their client].  
But I felt … that [the defence advocate] was picking on me a little bit.  And 
that it went over and above maybe what he should have done.”  (Chloe, 
victim) 
 
“I suppose they are just doing their job. But at the end of the day they should 
at least let us explain what’s going on and stuff, instead of just firing questions 
at us.” (Kai, young defendant) 
 
“I know [that the defence advocate has] to do their job but I think they go 
overboard a bit because he just obviously wasn't listening to what I was 
saying … Even the judge did have a go at him in the end.” (Sarah, witness) 
 
It follows, therefore, that more consideration should be given not just to the role of 
professionals in “doing their job” but on what it means for them to “do their work 
better”67 and on how to promote a culture which supports this. The quotations above 
demonstrate how court users largely attributed the negative aspects of advocates 
“doing their job” to the pursuit of the desired outcome; one way in which the 
engagement of court users could be enhanced is by focusing on the ways in which 
legal professionals can do their job “better” at a procedural level. The following 
quotations from Freya, a victim of sexual assault and other violent offences, and 
Austin, a young defendant, highlight the value that considerate interactions can have 
on court users’ feelings of engagement in the court process: 
 
“I felt comfortable in the surroundings. … I felt comfortable with all the staff. 
They were very polite, kind. They explained everything that happened. The 
judge was very fair. … I think overall it was – I can’t say a good experience, 
but I think it was fair and I don’t think I would change anything within the 
actual process really apart from obviously it being prolonged for so long. But I 
understand things happen, and evidence has to be thorough.” (Freya) 
 
“I really like [my advocate] because she’s just straight talking. … She always 
keeps me updated, always sends letters out saying what’s happening ... I like 
to be informed. … I went to see her before I went to court. It was a good thing 
because I got to build a rapport before I got to court and I knew she was 
acting in my best interests. … When she’s in court, it’s all court language and 
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stuff like that so I don’t really get it but when she talks to me one-on-one in 
meetings, she always simplifies it down so that I can understand everything 
she is saying.” (Austin) 
 
It is encouraging to conclude by noting that there are, in fact, some emerging signs of 
cultural shift. Recent research carried out by the author document the occurrence of 
procedurally just interactions between court users and legal professionals.68 These 
include examples of prosecutors introducing themselves and explaining their role to 
witnesses before they give evidence; efforts being made by some defence lawyers to 
put the defence case to witnesses without adopting aggressive or belittling styles of 
communication; and judges and magistrates communicating in a direct and 
empathetic manner with defendants at the point of sentencing.  In a similar vein, 
Carline and Gunby, in their study of barristers’ perceptions of advocacy in rape 
cases, found receptiveness among advocates to improving procedural elements of 
the court process; such a response was also echoed by judges and advocates 
interviewed by Henderson. 69 The aforementioned challenges posed by the economic 
strains within the criminal justice system should be acknowledged; with the notable 
caveat that the kind of change called for in this paper – particularly that which 
focuses on the promotion of respectful, considerate and empathetic interactions – 
can, for the most part, be achieved without any substantial cost to the public (or 
indeed the individual legal professional’s) purse. 
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